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Abstract 
This paper studies the relationship between neighborhood income isolation, measured by 
the segregation of impoverished families, and crime. The theory of social disorganization 
explains the mechanism through which income isolation impacts criminal activity. I use data 
from North Carolina from 2009 to 2016 and find that the effects of isolation differ for violent 
and property crime, with income isolation having a significant negative effect on property 
crime. Violent crime however may be better explained by opportunity or relative deprivation 




Neighborhood characteristics have been shown to affect educational attainment, labor force 
outcomes, and criminal activity (see Durlauf 2004 and Graham 2018 for comprehensive 
summaries). Communities segregated by socioeconomic characteristics have limited 
opportunities for upward social mobility, which often results in a number of disparate 
outcomes. Concentrated poverty, defined as areas with over 40% impoverished people, 
became increasingly prevalent in the first part of the century with one in four places 
exceeding a poverty level of 20% and about one third of poor Americans living in “poor 
places” in 2009 (Lichter, Parisi, and Taquino 2012). Despite a 3% increase in overall poverty 
rates from 2014 to 2018, (Census Bureau) the continued segregation of impoverished people 
contributes to limited opportunities for upward mobility for poor families which affects 
mental and physical health outcomes (NBER “A Summary Overview of Moving to 
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Opportunity"). Further, socioeconomic segregation in neighborhoods has significant 
consequences for educational achievement and widens black-white test score gaps (Card 
and Rothstein 2007). Poverty has also been frequently linked to outcomes like criminal 
activity and exposure to violence has been shown to negatively impact adolescent health 
(Boynton-Jarrett et al. 2008). There is an ongoing need to understand factors that may 
predict crime, and by extension, socio-economic outcomes. Concentrated poverty and 
socioeconomic isolation are growing concerns in the United States and may have substantial 
consequences for violent and property crime. This paper studies to what extent income 
segregation, or isolation, affects community violent and property crime rates.  
Theory suggests the geographical distribution of disadvantage is a relevant factor of 
upward mobility and other neighborhood outcomes, like presence of crime, as it may impact 
the resources accessible to individuals (Kelly 2000; Bergman et al. 2019; Chamberlain and 
Hipp 2015). For example, education, job opportunities, medical services, nutrition resources, 
green spaces, infrastructure and other public goods are allocated with maximized 
opportunity for higher income neighborhoods and regions. Isolated, low income 
neighborhoods have the most limited access to these resources. Income isolation, also 
referred to as income segregation, is defined here as the number of impoverished families in 
a county that would need to relocate in order for each included neighborhood to achieve 
perfect integration. Isolation in this sense poses an obstacle for the distribution of these 
public goods, especially to low-income isolated areas. The areas left with fewer resources 
are strained, as per capita demand for the existing resources is increased and as a 
consequence, resources are “spread thin.” This leads to a breakdown in normal societal 
organization which typically regulates criminal activity. The overextension of resources 
[3] 
 
causes an increase in criminal activity, particularly in areas with increased income isolation. 
This is the theory of social disorganization (Chamberlain and Hipp 2015). 
I measure the effects of income isolation on violent and property crime rates using 
county level data from North Carolina between 2009 and 2016. Following the theory of social 
disorganization, I suspect that income isolation is one of the primary indicators of impacted 
resource distributions, and thus criminal activity. Further, the absolute income of a 
neighborhood is also a predictor of social disorganization and crime. Areas of high poverty 
isolation may be areas with high absolute advantage. For example, a county with only one 
heavily impoverished neighborhood and many wealthy neighborhoods will be highly 
isolated and still advantaged, and may experience very little social disorganization.  Low 
income isolated neighborhoods are going to be most affected while high income isolated 
neighborhoods are likely to have more access to public goods and resources. Considering 
income isolation in the context of absolute poverty levels thus illuminates the relationship 
between income isolation and crime through the mechanism of social disorganization.  
The simple correlation between income isolation and criminal activity would 
overstate the relationship between isolation and crime because other factors are positively 
correlated with neighborhood income isolation, such as racial composition, police presence, 
and presence of renters, and are also positively correlated with crime. As such, omitted 
variable bias causes Ordinary Least Squares estimation methods to overstate the effect of 
income isolation on criminal activity. One method of dealing with this is to control for as 
many factors as possible—like racial composition, population density, presence of rental 
units and vacancies—but, this method is limited to only observable characteristics. Some 
factors remain that are unobservable with the available data yet still correlated with both 
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income isolation and crime rates. So, implementing a fixed effects method controls for 
county-dependent unobservable factors that are not time-varying, for example, municipal 
laws, physical neighborhood characteristics, or perhaps agency-specific policing policies. 
Other policing factors, like attitudes towards minority populations, number of employed 
police officers, and even election cycles, are time-varying within each county. These 
unobservable factors that vary overtime will not be controlled for with a fixed effects model 
and thus may still confound the estimated relationship between income isolation and 
property and violent crime rates. However, I predict most county unobservable factors that 
are related to either income isolation or crime rates are consistent over time and therefore, 
a fixed effects method is best to control for most county unobservables. 
 I use American Community Survey Data from the U.S. Census Bureau to measure 
various neighborhood characteristics, including minority composition, employment rates, 
income levels, presence of renters, as well as structural characteristics like presence of 
vacant homes. Data on both violent and property crime rates comes from the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program, which consists of reports from 
individual North Carolina law enforcement agencies on arrest records. I intend to use these 
arrest records as a proxy for crime and criminal activity generally, though there are a 
number of factors other than increased crime or criminal activity which may lead to higher 
arrest rates, such as informal policing practices that increase police presence in low-income, 
minority neighborhoods (Baumgartner et al. 2020). Increased policing may either 
discourage crime and thus decrease criminal activity, or it may increase the number of 
arrests without a change in criminal activity. The bias introduced by arrest records being an 
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imperfect measure of criminal activity is unmeasurable, and its bi-directional nature 
suggests that it will not impact the estimation of the effect of income isolation on crime rates. 
 Using neighborhood data, I compile a measure of county income isolation which can 
then be used to measure the effects of isolation on violent and property crime. Further, I 
show how poverty levels and presence of high-income families may mitigate or aggravate 
the effect of poverty isolation on crime rates. Current literature on neighborhood income 
characteristics and crime does not measure the impacts of income isolation, despite the 
evidence of socio-economic and racial-ethnic segregation being significant predictors of 
many other neighborhood outcomes, with racial-ethnic segregation having a significant 
effect on crime, too. I contribute to the study of neighborhood effects on crime rates by 
measuring income isolation specifically, and dealing with county fixed unobservables that 
may be correlated with isolation and crime, such as geography, policing policies, and 
infrastructure, by using a county fixed effects model.  
 The paper continues as follows: Section II introduces the relevant economic and 
sociological literature on neighborhood characteristics and crime rates, which includes 
considering poverty and income inequality, as well as income isolation. Section III introduces 
the data I use in more detail, including specifically how income isolation is measured. Section 
IV explains my empirical approach to measuring the effects of income isolation and poverty 
on violent and property crime, which includes implementing a fixed effects model. Section V 
contains a discussion of my findings and further explains the controls used.  
II. Relevant Literature 
 Crime and criminal activity have frequently been viewed as products of social 
interactions largely affected by neighborhood characteristics in economics and sociological 
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literature. Sociological literature suggests that the income characteristics of a neighborhood, 
such as income inequality or spatial income distribution, have significant impacts on violent 
and property crimes. To my knowledge, however, the existing literature has not identified 
the relationship between income isolation and crime. Income distributions over space are 
different from measures of income isolation because rather than identifying areas that are 
segregated by income, they identify neighborhoods or clusters of neighborhoods of high or 
low income. A county or city with an even income distribution may still have income isolation 
at the neighborhood level. Chamberlain and Hipp (2015) identify three primary mechanisms 
through which these neighborhood income characteristics may affect crime rates: 1) social 
disorganization, 2) opportunity, and 3) relative disadvantage. The mechanism through 
which income isolation affects crime rates is best explained by social disorganization theory, 
and the other two theories provide insight into observable neighborhood characteristics that 
are important confounding variables to control for.  
Social disorganization occurs in disadvantaged neighborhoods through a breakdown 
in normative behavior, which then contributes to higher crime rates. Social cohesion, studied 
by Glaeser and Sacerdote (2000), was found to discourage social disorganization by 
promoting normative behavior. They find that housing type, whether single family homes or 
high-rise apartments, influences social cohesion. The presence of renters and more 
apartment buildings significantly increases property crime due to the associated lack of 
social cohesion, because renters are less tied to the area compared to long-term homeowners. 
Social cohesion is one component of what Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls (1997) call 
collective efficacy—social cohesion with the willingness to intervene for the common good—
which they find mediates the effects of concentrated disadvantage and residential instability 
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on violence and crime. Income isolation, due to the obstacle it poses for the distribution of 
resources and public goods, causes social disorganization. This is the mechanism through 
which income isolation affects crime rates. Increased social cohesion or collective efficacy 
may mitigate the impact of income isolation on crime. 
Secondly, opportunity theory suggests that crime is affected by neighborhood income 
characteristics through varying opportunities to commit crimes, such that crime rates 
increase when there are higher expected payoffs or lower risks of penalty. Taylor, Haberman, 
and Groff (2019) find that community socioeconomic status is a significant predictor of crime 
in community parks, indicating that neighborhood income conditions may directly affect 
criminal behavior. Cornwell and Trumbull (1994) model crime as an outcome of perceived 
risks and rewards using a county fixed effects model and find that job-status and income 
levels may determine criminal outcomes, whereas typical deterrence, like police presence 
and heavier sentencing are not significant predictors of crime. Ackerman and Rossmo (2015) 
find that criminals are willing to travel outside of their neighborhoods to commit property 
crime, whereas violent crime is more local to the criminals’ residency. This literature 
suggests that controlling for factors that affect criminal opportunity is necessary to measure 
the effects of a neighborhood’s income characteristics on property and violent crime rates. 
Although police presence and sentencing behavior is unobservable, I control for population 
density, presence of vacant units, and employment rates which may influence criminal 
opportunities. 
Lastly, relative deprivation theory suggests that neighborhoods that are 
disadvantaged relative to the surrounding areas experience higher crime due to the 
perceived existence of deprivation. A distinction is drawn here between relative 
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disadvantage and absolute disadvantage, whereas relative disadvantage reflects one 
neighborhood’s level of disadvantage compared to the surrounding areas. Therefore, a 
neighborhood that is objectively advantaged (at least not disadvantaged) can still have high 
relative disadvantage if the surrounding areas are even more so advantaged. Where relative 
disadvantage measures the magnitude of income disparities, income isolation considers the 
distribution of income in a community. A neighborhood can be disadvantaged and perfectly 
segregated or perfectly integrated. Peterson and Krivo (2009) study nearby neighborhood 
conditions and find that proximity to disadvantaged neighborhoods affects levels of violence 
across neighborhoods, independent of their respective racial compositions. Adding to the 
literature on spatial distributions of income in communities, Krivo et al (2015) measure the 
probability of interaction between high- and low-income individuals, and find that areas 
characterized by high-low income segregation are associated with higher levels of crime, 
which affirms relative deprivation theory. Studying urban communities, Kelly (2000) finds 
that income inequality, measured with a GINI coefficient, has a significant impact on violent 
crime but not property crime, indicating that property crime may be less affected through 
the relative deprivation mechanism than violent crime. As suggested by the theory of relative 
deprivation, minority composition and poverty levels, both characteristics associated with 
higher levels of disadvantage, may be confounding variables when estimating the effect of 
income isolation on crime rates. To study this effect through the mechanism of social 
disorganization, I will control for these confounding variables. 
Given the evidence of the relationship between neighborhood income characteristics 
and violent and property crime, I will expand on the existing literature by taking a novel 
approach; I use income isolation as the primary income characteristic that determines crime 
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outcomes, where most literature instead considers income inequality or disadvantage. 
Economic literature and sociological literature alike show how segregation by socio-
economic status or race-ethnicity has significant influences on many neighborhood 
outcomes. Further, the findings presented above show that income characteristics are 
important predictors of neighborhood crime rates. I predict that, given the evidence of 
segregation affecting neighborhood characteristics, and of income characteristics affecting 
crime, the degree of income isolation in a community, i.e. neighborhood income segregation, 
is a necessary determinant to consider in the study of neighborhood crime outcomes. 
Though both income isolation and income inequality affect criminal activity in a 
neighborhood, income isolation is distinct, because rather than measuring the magnitude of 
income differences, isolation measures the distribution of income within a neighborhood.  
Graham (2018) provides a recent summary of the economic literature on 
neighborhood effects and provides techniques for measuring these effects on different 
outcomes, including educational attainment, labor force outcomes, and criminal activity.  
I use a dissimilarity index, a widely used measure for racial segregation as presented by 
Graham, and adapt it to study the effects of income isolation in North Carolina 
neighborhoods on crime rate levels.  
Current literature on the topic, as summarized above, studies the effects of income 
characteristics on crime rates and there has been extensive research on racial segregation 
and neighborhood outcomes. However, the effects of income isolation on neighborhood 
crime remain unstudied. Social disorganization theory suggests that income segregation, in 
addition to other income characteristics like poverty levels, likely impacts violent and 
property crime rates. Effects on crime rates are predicted to be the most extensive in isolated 
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areas with high poverty. This method presented below will illuminate the effects of 
neighborhood income isolation on violent and property crime rates and how poverty 
moderates this effect. 
III. Data 
 Following Cornwell and Trumbull’s methods (1994), I use North Carolina county level 
data on violent crime and property crime for 7 years, 2009 to 2016. 
A. Crime 
Data on crime are compiled from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s UCR Program, 
in which participating law enforcement agencies voluntarily submit annual summary 
reports. As such, this data may be affected by agency-level inconsistencies in reporting. 
However, agencies in North Carolina are required to submit crime reports to the State 
Bureau of Investigation, which is then reported to the UCR program. For each year in the 
sample, approximately 400 of the 530 law enforcement agencies contributed summary 
reports to the UCR database (“NCSBI - Method of Data Collection”). Therefore, I assume that 
the data is representative of crime rates in North Carolina counties and that no precinct is 
more or less likely than another to refrain from participating in reporting. Though unable to 
test this assumption for individual precincts due to data limitations, I use the percentage of 
law-enforcement agencies in a county that failed to report crime for any given year in the 
sample to determine if non-participation is related to any determinants.  
I find that consistent participation in crime reporting is not directly strongly 
correlated with any county-characteristics, but basic regressions show that high-income 
presence increases how many agencies report crime in a given county in a given year, while 
minority populations reduce participation in crime reporting. Likewise, some counties are 
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statistically more likely than others to have law-enforcement agencies that participate 
consistently in reporting crime. Inconsistencies in participation may be due to unobservable 
county characteristics that are correlated with high-income and minority presence. This 
indicates that bias in the crime sample is not random. Crime in counties with higher minority 
presence are underrepresented in the sample, while crime in counties with more high-
income households are overrepresented. As a consequence of these missing observations, 
the results presented in Section V may be biased and thus not representative of crime in 
North Carolina. 
Figure I: Average Crime Rates Overtime 
 
The precinct level UCR data is compiled at the county level so that each county’s 
violent and property crime rates may be observed. Crime offenses are categorized as 
“violent,” which includes offenses like murder and assault, “property,” such as theft and 
arson, and “victimless,” which includes offenses such as gambling or prostitution. Crime 
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rates of each time are a ratio of the number of occurrences of each crime type to the total 
population of the county, as reported in the UCR data. 
As shown in Figure I, violent and property crime rates have decreased from 2009 to 
2016. Victimless crime is the most prevalent, and property crime is more prevalent than 
violent crime. Figure II displays average income isolation levels and family poverty rates for 
each year included in the sample. Income isolation, represented by the dissimilarity measure, 
and family poverty rates have both trended downward slightly. This indicates incomes in 
North Carolina in 2018 are less segregated than in 2009, and a smaller proportion of families 
are identified as being impoverished. Census data from 2018 indicates that North Carolina 
has a GINI index of 0.48, and is the 16th U.S. state with the highest income inequality (Duffin 
2019). This suggests that though similar to inequality levels at the country level, North 
Carolina experiences more inequality than most states, which may indicate that the state 
also experiences higher income isolation than the national average.  




B. County Characteristics 
The American Community Survey (ACS), which is published annually by the U.S. 
Census Bureau, contains information on demographic, social, economic, and housing 
characteristics. I use 5-Year Estimates, meaning that the data are collected over five years 
and combined in order to create a larger sample size, so that data for small geographies are 
valid and more detailed data are available from 2009-2016 at the Census-block level. These 
more detailed data allow for a better analysis of neighborhood characteristics, particularly 
income isolation, discussed in more detail below, and their effects on crime. Other controls 
include the population of renters or homeowners, racial compositions of counties, building 
structure types and prevalence vacant homes, county population and population density, as 
well as employment and income distributions. Poverty is determined by Census Bureau 
thresholds that are based on family sizes and associated income. Families that fall below the 
threshold are deemed impoverished. To measure poverty, I use the number of impoverished 
families in a neighborhood divided by the total number of families in that respective 
neighborhood, which gives a percentage of impoverished families. The county income 
distribution is measured by the number of households in each of the following annual income 
brackets: less than $25,000, between $25,000 and $44,999, between $45,000 and $99,999, 
and $100,000 and over. The latter category will be considered “high-income.” 
Vacant houses and population density are expected to be positively correlated with 
crime rates as they indicate more opportunities for criminal activity. Population density 
increases the opportunity a criminal has to interact with a potential victim, or a potential 
victim’s property. Likewise, vacant houses serve as a proxy for unfavorable neighborhood 
characteristics, like crime or high concentrated disadvantage. Composition of renters and 
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homeowners serves as a measure of “social cohesion,” as discussed above, which has been 
shown to affect crime in a community. Other socioeconomic controls, specifically minority 
composition and income levels may also affect a community’s levels of isolation and crime 
rates.  
Table 1: Means, Standard Deviations, Between- and Within-County Variation 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Between Within 
Property Crime, per 1,000 people 28.395 17.676 16.4539 6.6401 
Violent Crime, per 1,000 people 6.141 4.157 3.8179 1.6823 
Isolation 0.403 0.106 0.0898 0.0582 
% Families in Poverty 0.138 0.041 0.0392 0.0138 
Households with Annual Income >$100,00 0.155 0.057 0.0557 0.0110 
% Minority 0.310 0.175 0.1756 0.0088 
% Rental Units 0.238 0.072 0.0711 0.0135 
% Employed 0.417 0.044 0.0427 0.0128 
% Vacant Units 0.192 0.104 0.1032 0.0141 
Population (10,000s) 9.558 14.348 14.3872 0.8274 
Population Density 195.761 263.400 264.1355 14.9320 
C. Isolation 
Isolation is measured by implementing a Dissimilarity Index and is interpreted as the 
county-wide proportion of impoverished families who would need to move in order to 
achieve perfect income integration, relative to the proportion that would need to move 
under a status quo of perfect income segregation (Graham 2018) i.e, 
, 
where s(Z) is the proportion of families in neighborhood i in year t that are impoverished, 
while Q is the county-wide frequency of impoverished families. The more different or 
dissimilar the expected neighborhood proportion of impoverished families (E[s(Z)]) is from 
the expected county-wide proportion (E[Q]), the closer the Dissimilarity Index will be to one. 
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If the expected neighborhood proportion of impoverished families is the same as the 
expected county-wide proportion, the value will be zero. Thus, a value of one means the 
county is perfectly segregated with respect to impoverished families, while a value of zero 
implies perfect integration of impoverished families. Table II shows average crime rates, 
minority presence, poverty levels, and presence of high-income households at 3 levels of 
income isolation. The least isolated counties, on average, have lower violent and property 
crime rates than the most isolated counties, though counties in the middle-income isolation 
group have the highest crime rates. This affirms social disorganization theory--areas with 
the least income isolation are the most integrated and thus low income or impoverished 
families are better able to access public goods. Further, on average the presence of 
impoverished families significantly decreases with increased isolation. This indicates that 
isolated counties, or counties with heavy poverty segregation, also have reduced presence of 
impoverished families. Likewise, the percentage of high-income households increases with 
isolation, suggesting that the most isolated communities are also wealthier. 
Table II: Comparison of Key Variables over Income Isolation Tertiles 




Property Crime per 1,000 people 24.267 31.265***   29.658*** 
Violent Crime per 1,000 people 5.162 6.839*** 6.423*** 
% Impoverished Families 0.157 0.138*** 0.119*** 
% High Income 0.123 0.147*** 0.194*** 
% Minority Population 0.320 0.287* 0.323 
Average values for each included characteristic are displayed across income isolation tertiles. 
Asterisks represent significant differences of the two higher isolation tertiles compared to the 
lowest isolation tertile based on two-group t-tests such that * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, and ***p<0.001. 
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IV. Empirical Model 
Income characteristics have been shown to influence crime rates through several 
sociological mechanisms. I expect poverty levels to exacerbate the effect of income isolation 
on crime rates through a social disorganization mechanism. Neighborhoods isolated by 
income will experience more social disorganization and thus may experience more violent 
and property crime, especially isolated neighborhoods with high levels of poverty.  
In order to observe the effects of income isolation and income inequality on property 
and violent crime rates in county i at year t, crime rates, Yit, are modelled as a function of 
poverty isolation, represented by Iit, and absolute poverty levels, measured by the 
proportion of impoverished families, Pit such that 
 . 
The coefficient β represents the effect of poverty isolation on the respective crime rate, while 
ζ represents the direct effect of poverty on the crime rate and λ is the effect of high income 
on the crime rate. The coefficient η measures the joint effect of poverty isolation and absolute 
poverty on crime rates, while μ measures the interaction between high income and 
neighborhood isolation. γ represents the effect of each other determinant and control, 
including presence of renters and vacant homes to measure social cohesion, population and 
population density which affect criminal opportunities, and employment levels, which will 
control for any observable effects of the relative deprivation or opportunity mechanisms. 
The δi are county fixed effects, such that time invariant county unobservables may be 
controlled for. Unobservable characteristics that are not due to variation between counties, 
or are time-varying are included as εit. 
[17] 
 
 Implementing a fixed effects model controls for fixed unobservable county 
characteristics, such as policing or local-government policies, that may be correlated with 
isolation, income, and crime. These characteristics include anything that would affect both 
neighborhood characteristics and crime rates. For example, policing policies that differ from 
precinct to precinct may be correlated with neighborhood income (higher income means 
higher taxes and perhaps a larger budget for law-enforcement agencies) and also would 
affect crime rates by acting as a deterrence. A fixed effects estimation strategy assumes that 
each unobservable characteristic for each county is correlated with the explanatory 
variables. A random effects model, on the other hand, while controlling for county-specific 
unobservables, assumes that these factors are random. There is a possibility that a random 
effects estimation method will better estimate the data—I test for this in Section V. Failing 
to control for these unobservable county characteristics with a fixed effects or random 
effects model would cause Ordinary Least Squares estimation methods to overstate the 
relationship between income isolation and crime rates because it identifies these 
unobserved correlates as contributing to the relationship between income isolation and 
crime rates. As shown in Figure I, of the total variation in violent crime rates, approximately 
40% is due to within-county variation. For property crime rates, within-county variation 
accounts for approximately 38% of the overall variation. For income isolation, within-county 
variation comprises over 50% of the total variation. This indicates that for the variation in 
property crime rates, violent crime rates and income isolation, a large proportion is due to 
within-county variation. There appears to be enough within-county variation to estimate a 




This section reports results from the fixed-effects and random-effects model and for 
both violent crime rates (Table III) and property crime rates (Table IV) for each county in 
North Carolina from 2009 to 2016. For each table, Column 1 contains results from a random 
effects regression without control variables. Column 2 shows random effects regression 
results with control variables included. The results from the fixed effects model including 
control variables are shown in Column 3. Column 4 also shows results from the fixed effects 
regression and full control variables as well as county specific time trends instead of year 
indicator variables.  
I conducted Hausman tests to determine if random effects or fixed effects estimation 
methods were better. For violent crime, a p-value of 0.0001 and chi-squared of 47.000 
indicate that the null hypothesis of no systematic difference between random effects and 
fixed effects models does not hold. This suggests that unobservable factors are strongly 
correlated with the regressors and that a fixed effects method is appropriate to model violent 
crime. The p-value resulting from the property crime Hausman test is 0.2024, suggesting 
that there is no systematic difference between random effects and fixed effects models. Given 
this, a random effects model for property crime may be a more efficient estimation method 
than a fixed effects method. However, because the Hausman test is biased towards the null 
hypothesis, I report both random effects and fixed effects results for both property crime 




Table III: Effects of Income Isolation on Violent Crime 
Standard errors are displayed in parentheses below estimates. Significance levels are represented 
as follows: * P<0.10, ** P<0.05, *** P<0.01. Constant is included but not shown. N=800. 
The point estimates presented in Table III suggest a negative relationship between 
neighborhood income isolation and violent crime. Though there is no evidence that this 
relationship is statistically different from zero, it is still meaningful because it indicates that 
the more isolated impoverished people are in a community, the lower the violent crime rate 
in that county is. This is contrary to the theory of social disorganization and indicates that 
income characteristics may affect violent crime through another sociological mechanism. A 
heavily isolated community may experience more social cohesion due to increased 
homogeneity, which may result in fewer instances of crime. The results in Table III also 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
INCOME ISOLATION 
0.255 -0.441 -0.673 -0.253 
(1.109) (1.127) (1.133) (0.993) 
POVERTY 
6.511 3.704 1.134 0.463 
(4.321) (4.602) (4.780) (5.354) 
HIGH INCOME 
1.103 -0.408 1.113 7.238 
(4.797) (5.481) (6.938) (8.232) 
% MINORITY 
 5.462** -20.01** -10.73 
 (2.217) (8.716) (10.71) 
% RENTALS 
 6.729 0.792 14.95* 
 (4.902) (5.922) (7.650) 
% EMPLOYED 
 10.33* 17.09** 11.14 
 (5.802) (6.622) (7.481) 
% VACANCIES 
 2.834 8.703 8.439 
 (3.442) (5.422) (7.883) 
POPULATION (10,000S) 
 0.0588 -0.185 -1.479 
 (0.0538) (0.172) (0.960) 
POPULATION DENSITY 
 -0.00357 0.0191* 0.00543 
 (0.00303) (0.00980) (0.0319) 
ADJUSTED R-SQUARED   0.126 0.341 
CONTROLS INCLUDED No Yes Yes Yes 
RANDOM EFFECTS Yes Yes No No 
FIXED EFFECTS No No Yes Yes 
YEAR INDICATOR Yes Yes Yes No 
COUNTY SPECIFIC YEAR 
TRENDS 
No No No Yes 
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indicate that county specific time trends (Column 4) do not alter the direction or significance 
of the relationship. The negative relationship between isolation and crime is sustained even 
when time-varying factors, like sheriff’s elections or number of active police officers, are 
controlled for with county-specific year trends. Further, as suggested by the results of the 
Hausman test, the fixed effects model of violent crime that does not include county specific 
time trends (Column 3) is taken to be the most accurate estimation method. 
Violent crime, when compared to property crime, includes crimes of passion and 
therefore may be less predictable by neighborhood factors in general, though this would be 
contrary to previous literature that does find a significant relationship here. It is also 
plausible that violent crime is more subjected to measurement error due to its relative 
infrequency, which would contribute to the estimated relationships’ insignificance. The 
results in Table IV indicate that likewise to violent crime, there is a negative relationship 
between property crime and income isolation. Given the results of the Hausman test, the 
results of the random effects model (Column 2) are taken to be more accurate than those of 
the fixed effects model (Columns 3 and 4). A negative relationship here once again suggests 
that the more isolated impoverished families in a county are, the lower the crime rate. This 
however contradicts social disorganization theory which suggests poverty isolation impairs 
a neighborhood’s access to resources which results in increased crime, especially property 
crime. However, it is important to consider the interaction effect between income isolation 
and absolute income levels. It could be the case that isolated neighborhoods are also mostly 
comprised of high-income households, which would counteract the disruption of the 
distribution of goods and resources in a neighborhood. As shown in Table II, the most 
isolated communities have significantly more high-income households and significantly 
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fewer impoverished families than the least isolated communities. To test this idea, I include 
interaction effects for both violent crime rates and property crime rates in Table V. 
Table IV: Effects of Income Isolation on Property Crime 
Standard errors are displayed in parentheses below estimates. Significance levels are represented as 
follows: * P<0.10, ** P<0.05, *** P<0.01. constant is included but not shown. N=800. 
 For both violent crime and property crime results, employment has a statistically 
significant positive effect on crime, though it is of a greater magnitude for property crime. 
Given this counterintuitive relationship, I tested the correlation and collinearity of 
employment, poverty, and high-income presence to determine if conditioning on high- 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
INCOME ISOLATION 
-9.156** -11.19** -12.02*** -4.811 
(4.428) (4.501) (4.534) (3.992) 
POVERTY 
1.107 2.852 -1.632 -14.89 
(17.43) (18.50) (19.13) (21.52) 
HIGH INCOME 
-2.073 -13.95 -20.68 -9.230 
(20.29) (22.84) (27.77) (33.10) 
% MINORITY 
 8.581 -58.37* -30.30 
 (9.909) (34.88) (43.07) 
% RENTALS 
 21.30 -1.060 29.38 
 (20.37) (23.70) (30.75) 
% EMPLOYED 
 53.53** 68.61*** -24.22 
 (23.73) (26.50) (30.07) 
% VACANCIES 
 13.80 30.88 -3.179 
 (14.87) (21.70) (31.69) 
POPULATION (10,000S) 
 0.372 0.489 0.522 
 (0.244) (0.690) (3.858) 
POPULATION DENSITY 
 -0.0195 0.0217 -0.0176 
 (0.0137) (0.0392) (0.128) 
ADJUSTED R-SQUARED   0.102 0.316 
CONTROLS INCLUDED No Yes Yes Yes 
RANDOM EFFECTS Yes Yes No No 
FIXED EFFECTS No No Yes Yes 
YEAR INDICATOR Yes Yes Yes No 
COUNTY SPECIFIC YEAR 
TRENDS 
No No No Yes 
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income households could skew the employment estimation. Though employment is strongly 
correlated with high-income presence (r=0.71) and moderately correlated with poverty   
(r=-0.65), I did not find any evidence of collinearity between any explanatory or control 
variables. Though counter-intuitive, the positive relationship between employment and 
violent and property crime is not explained by having conditioned on high-income 
households. This relationship is not well explained by existing sociological or economic 
theories on neighborhood characteristics and crime, either. 
Table V: Effects of Income Isolation and Interactions with Poverty and High Income 
Standard errors are displayed in parentheses below estimates. Significance levels are represented as 
follows: * P<0.10, ** P<0.05, *** P<0.01. Constant and year indicators are included but not shown. 
Controls are also included but suppressed from table. N=800. 
Columns 1 and 3 display results from a random effects regression on each respective 
crime type. Columns 2 and 4 display fixed effects regression results for the corresponding 
crime types. For both violent crime and property crime, there is a positive interaction 
between income isolation and poverty, indicating that isolated communities with a larger 
presence of impoverished families experience increased crime in general. The negative 
interaction between income isolation and high-income households suggests that presence of 
 Violent Crime Property Crime 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
INCOME ISOLATION 
0.738 0.845 -7.177 -16.50 
(6.556) (6.685) (26.20) (26.75) 
POVERTY 
-0.307 -0.884 -16.06 -24.36 
(10.74) (10.82) (42.89) (43.31) 
HIGH INCOME 
8.862 8.003 24.86 -4.703 
(9.801) (10.68) (39.68) (42.75) 
ISOLATION * POVERTY 
INTERACTION 
14.62 8.344 66.80 75.35 
(28.42) (28.51) (113.4) (114.1) 
ISOLATION * HIGH INCOME 
INTERACTION 
-20.47 -17.62 -84.72 -39.40 
(20.17) (21.51) (80.80) (86.08) 
ADJUSTED R-SQUARED  0.126  0.101 
RANDOM EFFECTS Yes No Yes No 
FIXED EFFECTS No Yes No Yes 
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high-income households in isolated neighborhoods decreases crime in general. The large 
point estimates, especially for property crime, support my theory that isolated impoverished 
communities experience social disorganization more so than isolated high-income areas, but 
may not be statistically different from zero.  
Table VI: Relationship of Property and Violent Crime and 
Income Isolation as an Indicator 
 
Violent Crime Property Crime 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
HIGH ISOLATION 
INDICATOR 
-1.579 -1.688 -4.268 -5.087 
(1.299) (1.285) (5.200) (5.166) 
POVERTY 
2.220 -0.584 4.826 -1.465 
(5.112) (5.249) (20.60) (21.10) 
HIGH INCOME 
-6.261 -4.555 -27.37 -33.33 
(6.642) (7.835) (27.43) (31.50) 
HIGH ISOLATION * 
POVERTY INTERACTION 
4.944 4.648 9.296 10.17 
(5.095) (5.037) (20.40) (20.25) 
HIGH ISOLATION * HIGH 
INCOME INTERACTION 
7.496 7.952 16.68 19.24 
(5.200) (5.159) (20.83) (20.74) 
ADJUSTED R-SQUARED  0.126  0.094 
RANDOM EFFECTS Yes No Yes No 
FIXED EFFECTS No Yes No Yes 
Standard errors are displayed in parentheses below estimates. Significance levels are represented 
as follows: * P<0.10, ** P<0.05, *** P<0.01. Constant and year indicator variables are included but 
not shown. Controls are also included and suppressed from table. N=800. 
I further consider income isolation as an indicator variable, presented above in Table 
VI, as the impact of income isolation on criminal activity may be more salient when 
comparing areas with high isolation to those with low isolation, rather than considering 
income isolation on a continuous scale. Table II indicates that there is a significant difference 
between crime rates in low isolated counties and moderate and high isolated counties. This 
relationship may not be linear either, as criminal activity, both violent and property, 
increases from low isolated counties to moderately isolated counties, but decreases from 
moderate to high isolation.  
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Both random effects and fixed effects regression results from violent and property 
crime are presented above.  The indicator variable compares the counties with the lowest 
isolation to the highest two thirds of counties isolated by income. Violent crime is reported 
in Columns 1 and 2 and property crime is reported in Columns 3 and 4. Though not 
statistically different from zero, both poverty and high income have positive interaction 
effects on both types of crimes, suggesting that in counties with higher levels of income 
isolation, both high income and poverty increase violent and property crime. Notably, the 
interaction between high income and income isolation is contrary to the results in Table V. 
The positive interaction here could be due to increased criminal opportunity in higher 
income neighborhoods due to an increased expected payoff and increased incentive to 
commit property crimes. This opportunity theory however does not explain the same 
interaction effect on violent crimes.  
VI. Conclusion 
Sociological and economic research has shown that neighborhood income 
characteristics and racial segregation contribute to violent and property crime rates. This 
paper expands on the existing literature by studying income isolation specifically, and its 
effect on crime. I find a significant negative relationship between income isolation and 
property crime, indicating that communities isolated by income experience increased 
property crime. These results challenge social disorganization theory, which suggests 
income isolation has a positive relationship with violent and property crime, particularly in 
low-income neighborhoods. This apparent contradiction could be explained by social 
cohesion, which income isolation may increase due to socioeconomic homogeneity, resulting 
in lower crime in isolated neighborhoods. Future research may be strengthened by 
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estimating the effect of income isolation on social cohesion directly. Further, I estimated a 
positive interaction between income isolation and high-income households on property 
crime which affirms opportunity theory, though the interaction may not be different from 
zero.  
 The results also indicate a negative relationship between income isolation and 
violent crime, though there is not enough evidence to prove this relationship is statistically 
different from zero. Previous studies, however, suggest there is a relationship between 
neighborhood income characteristics and violent crime, so further research is necessary to 
elucidate if this relationship is truly zero, or violent crime rates are subjected to 
measurement error that bias the estimated relationship towards zero.  
Further, each of the years included in this study was during a period of economic 
expansion. This lack of variation could be contributing to statistically insignificant results. 
Including data from before the 2008 recession would introduce more variation in future 
research and perhaps may produce more significant results. In conclusion, future research 
is necessary to understand the interaction between income isolation and high income and 
poverty levels, and may further elucidate through which mechanism neighborhood income 
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